Who downsizes for longer? A longitudinal analysis by Fernando Munoz-Bullon
  1 
 
 
Working Paper 08 28  Departamento de Economía de la Empresa  
Business Economic Series 05  Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 
June 2008  Calle Madrid, 126 
  28903 Getafe (Spain) 
  Fax (34 91) 6249607 
 
 
Who downsizes for longer
 ? A longitudinal analysis







This contribution investigates why firms keep on downsizing once they have started to do so. From a 
theoretical  standpoint,  we  develop  economic  and  institutional  explanations  for  explaining  corporate 
downsizing duration. The empirical work is carried out applying event history techniques to a sample of 
manufacturing firms drawn from the Spanish Survey on Business Strategies from 1994 to 2005. Although 
results show support for persistence in downsizing over  time, repeated personnel reductions is not a 
widespread tool in managing the workforce in this country.  In addition, we find certain key corporate 
parameters such as profitability, temporality rate, size and employment termination costs (as  well as 
market  demand  trends)  to  be  important  determinants  of  the  continuation  of  on going  downsizing 




Keywords:  Downsizing  duration,  Spain,  organizational  learning,  manufacturing  firms,  temporary 
contracts, employment termination costs. 
JEL Classification: M54, J65, J21. 
                                                           
* Financial support from both the Regional Government at Castilla y León (project SA020A05), and from 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (project CCG07 UC3M/HUM 3287) is gratefully acknowledged. The 
data used in this work were made available from Fundación Empresa Pública. This work benefited from 
comments received from participants at EURAM 2008 Conference (Slovenia).  The usual disclaimer 
applies. 
1 Sección de Organización de Empresas. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.  C/ Madrid, 126. 28903   




The search for competitive advantage has led organizations to become more efficient 
and flexible in their use of human resources. Over the past two decades, a common 
organizational  response  has  been  to  reduce  workforce  numbers  through  downsizing 
(Iverson and Pullman, 2003). Its prevalence in management literature since the 1980s is 
due to the fact that many organizations use downsizing as a tool to cut costs, and/or to 
improve profitability and productivity. Particularly in the United States, since the 1980s 
repeated  waves  of  highly  publicized  large  scale  layoffs  have  occurred:  in  the  mid 
nineties, fully 100 percent of Fortune 500 companies reported plans to downsize in the 
next five years (Diamond et al., 1996). Surprisingly, in spite of the fact that the evidence 
so  far  available  suggests  that  the  much  sought after  cost  reductions  and  increased 
efficiencies  have  not  materialized  (Cameron,  1998;  Ebadan  and  Winstanley,  1997; 
Mentzer, 1996), corporate and public sector managers in this country have shown a 
strong propensity to embrace downsizing: companies which have been employing this 
cost cutting  method  are  still  cutting  back  years  later  (DeMeuse,  Vanderheiden  and 
Bergmann,  1994;  Diamond  et  al.,  1996).  That  is,  research  has  found  multiple 
downsizing efforts by the same firm to be rather widespread. For instance, DeMeuse, 
Vanderheiden and Bergmann (1994) found that 62 percent of the companies in their 
sample that downsized in 1989 likewise downsized in 1990; furthermore, 85 percent of 
the companies that downsized in 1989 downsized again in 1991.  
Downsizing has also been extensively used by companies in economies characterized 
by stable employment practices in the last few years —such as some European countries 
(Filatotche,  Buck  and  Zuckov,  2000)  and  Japan  (Lee,  1997).  In  contrast  with  these 
economies, there remains no doubt that employers in the United States have pushed for 
and taken advantage of the greater facility to lay off workers (in terms of both a lack of 
legal  and  regulatory  constraints  and  social  norms)  when  business  reasons  make  it 
expensive to retain them. As opposed to the U.S., in most European economies it seems 
harder to initiate and continue with such downsizing practices. In particular, Spain is 
often regarded as a country characterized by a high protection of employees’ rights —
due to tough job security rules, a generous unemployment insurance system and high 
firing costs (Jimeno, 1998). Given these institutional features and the fact that continued 
experiences of downsizing can have an unsustainable impact on both companies and the 
community —repeated downsizing may lead to a workforce that no longer has any great 
faith in its employers, which in turn is expressed in a less than desirable performance   3 
(Mariappanadar,  2003)—  it  is  interesting  to  investigate  what  keeps  companies 
downsizing over time once they start doing so.  
This is precisely the objective of the present contribution: to amplify our knowledge on 
the  determinants  of  downsizing  duration  for  the  Spanish  case.    Our  focus  is  on 
understanding why firms keep on downsizing once they have started to do so. We, 
therefore, depart from previous literature —which has focused on the determinants of a 
firm’s  decision  to  downsize  or  the  extent  of  downsizing  (e.g.,  Vicente Lorente  and 
Suárez González, 2007; Requejo, 1996)— by centering, instead, on the temporal nature 
of downsizing. This requires both a longitudinal dataset —instead of cross sectional 
data which, despite being easy to collect and widely available, do not suffice to measure 
duration in downsizing— and an appropriate statistical method: event history analysis. 
This technique allows us to ask two kinds of questions regarding downsizing. The first 
question is useful to characterize the pattern of downsizing duration over time: does the 
length of time a firm has downsized influence its likelihood of continuing downsizing 
for longer? The second question asks us to examine the association between predictors 
of downsizing and its duration: which firm and market characteristics are associated 
with on going downsizing efforts? For this purpose, we use survey data for Spanish 
manufacturing firms, for the period 1994 2005, drawn from the Survey on Business 
Strategies —Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales; ESEE, hereafter. The dataset 
used  comprises  relevant  corporate  characteristics  which  might  be  driving  the 
continuation of firms in personnel reduction strategies.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  focuses  on  generation  of 
hypotheses. In section 3, we present the data and variables. The econometric model is 
presented in section 4, and estimation results in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
HYPOTHESES: EXPLAINING DOWNSIZING DURATION 
For the purposes of this study, we follow the lead of Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton 
(1988)  who  used  the  term  “workforce  reductions”  to  address  “downsizing”.  Since 
downsizing (when broadly defined) may incorporate the use of one or more resource 
reduction  options  (in  conjunctions  with  personnel  reductions),  the  term  workforce 
reduction better distinguishes it from these other restructuring methods (DeWitt 1993, 
1998; Hoskisson and Hitts 1994). More specifically, our definition of downsizing refers 
to  reductions  in  the  size  of  workforce  under  open ended  contracts  (or  permanent 
employment). The concept excludes reductions in the size of the temporary workforce, 
which do not normally imply the notion of actual downsizing. Therefore, we considered 
that a firm downsized during a given year if the number of employees under open ended   4 
contracts decreased from the previous year to the current year. Since our dataset collects 
the  size  of  permanent  work  force  at  the  end  of  each  year  (see  Section  3),  it  is 
straightforward to operationalize the latter’s percent variability from year t 1 to year t
1. 
In this section, we analyze the factors that may help explain the longevity of firms in 
organizational  downsizing.  We  claim  that,  once  the  firm  has  decided  to  reduce 
personnel,  its  duration  in  downsizing  is  shaped  by  its  experience  in  downsizing, 
institutional forces and by firm characteristics. 
Organizational experience in downsizing 
Socio-cognitive  and  institutional forces.  Following,  McKinley,  Sáncehz  and  Schick 
(1995)  —who  proposed  that  institutional  theory  can  help  explain  why  downsizing 
spread “like wildfire through the ranks of America’s largest corporations” (1995: 34)— 
there  would  exist  a  dynamic  that  leads  companies  to  undertake  downsizing  simply 
because others in their community are doing it. They observe that constraining forces 
were  at  work  pressuring  organizations  to  downsize  as  a  mode  of  conforming  to 
institutional rules — “the right walk to walk, the right talk to talk, the right look to 
look”  (1995:34).  Closely  related  to  constraining  forces  are  cloning  forces,  which 
“pressure organizations to mimic the actions of the most prestigious, visible members of 
their  industry”  (1995:34).  As  a  result,  through  these  social  and  cognitive processes, 
downsizing is taken for granted more and more and diffuses even in the absence of 
compelling evidence for its financial efficiency (O’Neill, Pouder and Buchholtz,1998). 
According  to  Cameron  (1994a:  183):  “most  companies  agree  that  their  downsizing 
efforts  are  guided  more  by  anecdotal  data  from  colleagues  who  have  downsized 
previously, by past experience garnered from having downsized multiple times, or by 
mere ‘gut feel’ for what is right than by a set of guidelines or principles that have been 
validated or legitimated”. In this same vein, McKinley, Zhao and Rust (2000) proposed 
an  “institutional  perspective”  of  organizational  downsizing  to  explain  the  popular 
adoption  of  downsizing  among  corporations  in  the  1990s.  They  contended  that 
downsizing takes on the status of an institutionalized norm and provides legitimacy to 
those  companies  implementing  it:  one  downsizing  announcement  may  motivate 
stakeholders to initiate (correctly or incorrectly) a subsequent round of layoffs and — 
                                                           
1 This definition conveys the usual idea of intentionality found in the downsizing literature, since (i) it 
excludes temporary employees (which is the convention) and (ii) includes layoffs, redundancies and early 
retirements (see Appendix A for a review on the procedures for employee reductions by employers in 
Spain). Thus, if despite implementing layoffs of permanent workers in a particular year the company ends 
up with an increase in the size of the permanent workforce (due to hiring new permanent workers), this 
situation is not considered as downsizing, according to our definition. Defining downsizing as the (net) 
reduction in the permanent work force is coincident with that used, among others, by Tang et al. (1995), 
Appelbaum et al. (1987), Lewis et al. (1996) or American Management Association (1998).    5 
depending on changing economic conditions, stakeholder pressures or the lead of other 
firms in the same industry— managers may believe that additional rounds of layoffs 
may be necessary. That is, downsizing decisions would not be based on performance 
concerns, but on the need to achieve or maintain social legitimacy
2.  
Organizational learning. Learning how to downsize effectively is important not only 
for  companies  experiencing  difficulties,  but  also  as  a  proactive  strategy  for  healthy 
organizations (Bruton, Keels and Shook, 1996; Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991; 
Greengard, 1993; Hitt et al., 1994).  Embarking on downsizing without learning how to 
do it well leads to several kinds of problems. The loss of vital organizational memory is 
one  of  the  negative  and  expensive  effects  firms  have  suffered  in  downsizing.  If 
managers  do  not  think  and  plan  ahead,  their  companies  risk  losing  key  skills  and 
experiences as well as valuable knowledge when employees are moved out of their 
working units or leave the organization entirely (Hitt et al., 1994:25)
3. 
A further typical negative effect of downsizing reported in the research that is relevant 
for organizational learning is that “it can foster an organization so preoccupied with 
bean counting, so anxious about where the ax will fall next, that employees become 
narrow  minded,  self absorbed,  and  risk  averse”  (Henkoff,  1990:26).  The  ability  of 
employees to continue to work well is likely to be severely curtailed in such stressful 
situations (Heckscher, 1995; Hitt et al., 1994:24), and they tend to be even less able to 
innovate and learn (Brockner, 1988; Dougherty and Bowman, 1995).  
Probably,  the  most  significant  conclusion  drawn  by  studies  of  experiences  in  U.S. 
corporations is that downsizing must be regarded as something firms have to actively 
learn how to do well. Instead of conceiving downsizing to be “a one time, quick fix 
solution” (Cascio, 1993:103), a comprehensive framework is required, a whole process 
of grappling with the underlying problems and developing a range of activities to both 
restructure the organization and enable employees to make the transition to different 
jobs within or outside the organization (Applebaum, 1991; Bruton, Keels and Shook, 
1996; Cameron, Freeman and Mishra, 1991).  
Therefore, in managing downsizing, companies must firstly conduct a solid analysis of 
the situation and build a shared need to change before engaging in cutbacks of any kind 
                                                           
2 Some tentative empirical evidence of institutional forces playing a role in the dispersion of downsizing 
is given by Budros (1999, 2000) and Love (2000). 
3 The American Management Association, which has conducted a series of large scale studies on 
downsizing, found that most companies fell short of the objectives they had originally established, and 
that nearly half of the firms were “badly” or “not well” prepared for the process (reported in Cascio, 
1993:97 99; see also De Meuse et al., 1994). 
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(Applebaum  1991).  Involving  employees  in  analyzing  the  situation  and  developing 
posible responses has been reported in the literature as an effective approach (Cameron, 
Freeman and Mishra, 1991; Feldman, 1993): this increases their awareness of the need 
to change and their willingness to participate in the process.  
 In  a  second  step,  companies  must  find  it  worthwhile  to  maximize  alternatives  to 
downsizing, in order both to maintain within the organization the experience and skills 
that have been built up over time and to act in a socially responsible manner towards 
employees (Cameron 1994b). Among the relevant practices described in the literature 
on downsizing are a) redeploying employees to other parts of the company, b) adjusting 
working  time  models  to  redistribute  work  differently  rather  than  to  simply  “reduce 
headcount” (Bode, 1994); c) combining the  gradual entry of  young people with the 
gradual  exit  of  older  workers  to  ensure  that  new  skills  are  brought  on  board  and 
experience based knowledge is passed on to the next generation. Parallel to looking for 
alternatives to downsizing are activities to cut costs, such as d) eliminating non essential 
work processes, not just people (Greengard, 1993; Henkoff, 1990; Tomasko, 1992); and 
e) ensuring that status symbols, perks and bonuses for senior management are in line 
with downsizing goals so that management’s commitment to cost cutting is credible and 
not  seen  to  be  purely  at  the  expense  of  other  employees  (Hammonds,  Zellner  and 
Melcher, 1996; O’Neill and Lenn, 1995). Possibly, the most significant alternative to 
downsizing is f) looking for new markets for products and services to enable growth 
rather than focusing only on cutbacks (European Round Table, 1997).  
In  a  third  step,  to  the  extent  that  layoffs  must  be  implemented  in  the  downsizing 
process,  the  former  must  be  managed  appropriately,  since  there  are  a  number  of 
practices  to  choose  from.  For  instance,  layoffs  can  be  made  across  the  board  or 
selectively;  in  order  to  avoid  being  left  “shorthanded  and  shortskilled”  (Hitt  et  al. 
1994:25), companies have learned that a better strategy may be a selective approach 
oriented to the key competencies needed in the organization. Whichever approach is 
taken, the communication of clear criteria contributes to a sense of fairness in layoff 
decisions (Greengard,1993), and companies have found it useful to train managers to 
communicate layoff decisions sensitively and effectively (Kets de Vries and Balasz, 
1996).  
The final steps in this process of organizational learning are to manage the employees 
remaining in the organization and implement changes in the organization itself (Heenan, 
1991).  The  literature  reports  that  a  frequent  mistake  is  to  overlook  the  effects  on 
“survivors” of the downsizing process, particularly of layoffs (Rubach, 1995). These   7 
employees have been found to experience fear of losing their job, guilt for still having it 
while former colleagues may be unemployed, anger at the organization that did this to 
them, and exhaustion from overload (Davenport, 1995; Smallwood and Jacobsen, 1987, 
Caplan and Teese, 1997). 
In sum, firms who fail to manage this learning process appropriately are less likely to 
make poor or incorrect decisions that lead to future downsizing either as a result of 
letting the wrong people go or failing to make significant enough cuts to have an effect.    
Thus, one would expect a positive relationship between the accumulation of knowledge 
—reflecting the organizational learning process in downsizing— and the duration of 
downsizing
4.  In  addition,  according  to  the  institutional  and  socio cognitive  forces 
discussed above, if companies see downsizing as something they have to get through by 
cobbling together a set of activities as they go, they are not likely to put in place the best 
available measures and use them effectively. Short termism will then affect the decision 
to go on downsizing and, as a result, the probability that downsizing will end falls the 
longer it goes on. For these reasons, experience in downsizing is taken into account with 
the inclusion of dummy variables (one for each year denoting duration in downsizing; 
see section 4 for further details on the way these variables are defined). 
Thus, from the previous arguments, we predict: 
Hypothesis 1: The longer the duration of downsizing, the more likely is downsizing to 
be continued. 
Institutional labour market context: Country-specific labour separation costs 
In  many  countries,  dismissals  of  workers  under  open ended  contracts  are  subject  to 
relatively  high  adjustment  costs.  These  adjustment  costs  include  fixed  employment 
costs  (e.g.,  administration  costs  for  hiring  and  layoff),  investments  in  firm  specific 
human capital, long term work incentives (e.g., seniority wages), and separation costs 
due to institutional employment protection (e.g., severance pay, law suits) —see Abowd 
and  Kramarz  (2003).  Among  the  latter,  in  Spain  firms’  costs  of  changing  their 
permanent workforce size are determined by legislation that protects workers against 
individual dismissals and by specific requirements for collective redundancies (Toharia 
and Malo, 2000). The main difference between temporary and open ended contracts is 
that the latter provide the right to sue the employer for unfair dismissals when the labor 
relationship is terminated by the employer: a dismissal can be very expensive for the 
employer in comparison to other countries (Appendix A reviews the procedures for 
                                                           
4 This does not imply that companies desire to remain in a downsizing mode, since this practice may have 
enough negative consequences for all concerned (even top managers).   8 
employee  reductions  by  employers  in  Spain).  Thus,  regulation  on  individual  and 
collective dismissals —as well as the retribution offered by the firm to workers in cases 
of early retirement— increases the costs enterprises incur when terminating contracts, 
either directly via payments or indirectly via procedural costs (e.g. notice periods or 
court trials). Such payments reduce the gain to a firm from dismissing a worker, and 
hence would be predicted to decrease the rate of worker dismissal. Moreover, not only 
by increasing the costs of employment adjustments are employment termination costs 
expected  to  slow  the  adjustment  of  employment  to  changes  in  output.  Contract 
provisions  may  also  require  advance  notice  of  layoffs,  transfer  opportunities,  or 
outplacement assistance. Advance notice of layoffs often leads to discussions between 
union and management that generate proposals for avoiding layoffs, such as economic 
concessions for job security (Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton, 1988). If this is the 
case, by foreseeing these discussions, management may be reluctant to go on with work 
force reductions (or may decide to postpone downsizing until the economic situation of 
the company is so compelling that severe downsizing is implemented to best accomplish 
shrinkage).  
On the whole, given that institutional labor market factors are expected to play a key 
role  as  regards  downsizing  duration
5,  we  use  a  proxy  for  the  extent  to  which  the 
company is incurring in costly adjustments of employment: the ratio of severance, early 
retirement and voluntary severance pay over total labor costs. Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms incurring larger costs in adjusting employment are less likely to 
continue downsizing. 
Firm characteristics 
Firm’s temporality rate: The importance of employment flexibility has been discussed 
in many economic and management studies (Abraham, 1988; Brodsky, 1994; Carlsson, 
1989; Houseman, 2001; Hunter et al., 1993). Firms have several options to react to 
demand induced output fluctuations (Pfeifer, 2005). One consists of varying the number 
of  temporary  employees  to  adjust  employment  to  firm’s  profit  maximizing  level. 
Typically,  the  peripheral  workforce  consists  of  contingent  workers  with  fixed term 
                                                           
5 A series of reforms attempted to remove existing rigidities in the Spanish labour market from the 
eighties, so that the responsiveness of employment to changes in output might have risen following these 
reforms. In 1984, the use of fixed term contracts was encouraged, which carried few of the costs 
associated with permanent employment. In 1994, a second batch of reforms was introduced aimed at 
gaining flexibility into the management of labor resources —to this end, apprenticeship, part time and 
temporary replacement work contracts were introduced, and collective redundancies deemed justifiable 
on technological, economic and certain other grounds were made easier (Corkhill and Harrison 2004).. 
Likewise, in 1997, permanent contracts were introduced with lower severance payments and firms were   9 
contracts, who have low levels of firm specific human capital and weak employment 
protection (OECD, 2002: 127 185; OECD, 2004: 61 125). Severance payments are low 
or even non existent for temporary contracts. Thus, temporary work arrangements offer 
potential  ways  to  avoid  adjustment  costs  and  as  such  they  may  help  accelerate  the 
adjustment of the workforce to economic shocks (Bentolila and Saint Paul, 1992; Foote 
and Folta, 2002; Hagen, 2003). This is particularly acute in Spain, where since 1992 
temporary employment has accounted for about one third of total employment—it is the 
highest rate in the European Union (in Europe the average proportion is around 13%)— 
and it has reached a kind of “steady state” from then on: independently of policies and 
of the business cycle, it has remained more or less stable. 
According  to  dual  labor  market  theory,  employees  with  temporary  contracts  can be 
interpreted  as  a  firm’s  peripheral  workforce,  whereas  non temporary  employment 
relationships are a typical characteristic of the core workforce (Atkinson, 1987; Cappelli 
and Neumark, 2004; Kalleberg, 2001). The core periphery hypothesis implies that non 
temporary employees gain a higher degree of job security due to the use of a flexible 
workforce, since temporary  employment is used as  a “buffer”, which is adjusted to 
demand fluctuations (Booth et al., 2002). Employers are able to treat temporary and 
regular, full time employees differently in many ways, such as the extent to which they 
are  promised  continued  employment,  what  they  are  expected  to  contribute  to  the 
organization and other understandings related to the employment contract. Permanent 
workers exploit their lower likelihood of becoming unemployed on the grounds that a 
‘high’ wage claim hardly affects their probability of survival since the eventually laid 
off worker is a temporary one given the lower dismissal costs associated to temporary 
work contracts. In short, the bargaining position of the insiders may be strengthened 
since dismissals provoked by excessive wage settlements may affect temporary workers 
first  (Jimeno et. al., 1993, Bentolila et. al., 1994).  
From the above considerations, it follows that firms may use fixed term contracts to 
adjust  to  demand  fluctuations  and  decrease  the  turnover  of  permanent  workers 
simultaneously. This way, firms would be taking advantage of the lower dismissal costs 
associated with the discharge of temporary workers when no longer needed. The firm 
temporality  rate  is  computed  by  dividing  the  number  of  workers  with  temporary 
workers over the total number of employees.  
Thus, the following hypothesis is put forward: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
allowed to dismiss workers on permanent contracts on the grounds of falling consumer demand and the 
need to regain competitiveness.     10 
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a larger proportion of temporary workers are less likely to 
continue downsizing. 
Firm size: Firm size is related to several organizational attributes. One such parameter 
is  the  amount  of  discretionary  resources  (i.e.,  slack)  that  firms  have  available 
(Dougherty, 1979). Organizational size reflects the discretionary resources available to 
(among other things) attract or provide for members of the organization. One purpose 
for which discretionary resources can be employed is to fund disengagement incentives, 
which  are  incentives provided  to  employees  to  entice  them  to  voluntarily  leave  the 
organization (such as early retirement programs or voluntary severance packages; see 
Nixon et al., 2004). Larger firms, with more absolute resources, may not feel as much 
impact on corporate performance of employing disengagement incentives compared to 
the impact on the performance of smaller firms. Additional links between firm size and 
the duration of downsizing occurs for two reasons: (i) the economic argument associates 
large size with operating inefficiencies: larger firms are more likely to be less efficient 
and to have more slack personnel (Budros, 1999). Therefore, the need for continuing 
downsizing might be more compelling: this way, managers might  enhance financial 
performance  by  preventing  their  firm  from  employing  too  many  people  and  from 
operating with over bureaucratic (or ill conceived) structures. And (ii) the institutional 
argument is that highly visible large firms downsize for longer in order to be viewed 
favourably by stakeholders as users of the latest corporate practice (Edelman, 1990; 
Powell, 1991) —see, in this respect, the arguments from section 2.1 above. The number 
of employees is included to control firm size through a set of dummy variables denoting 
≤ 50, > 50 & ≤ 100, >100 & ≤200, >200 & ≤ 500, and >500 employees. 
Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 4: The largest the size of the firm, the more likely the firm is to continue 
downsizing. 
Profitability. Unsatisfactory performance or significant profit declines are corroborated 
as  explanatory  factors  of  downsizing  (Kang  and  Shivdasani,  1997;  Rust,  1999; 
Ahmadjian and Robinson, 2001; Budros, 2002). When the firm implements downsizing 
once low levels profitability have been achieved, the downsizing could be viewed as a 
reactive measure in order to improve conditions in the future. Lengthening downsizing 
under these conditions may improve the short term prospects of the firm. When the 
decision to implement downsizing is followed by high company performance results, 
downsizing under these circumstances may be interpreted as a proactive strategy that 
would  create  higher  cash  flows  available  to  shareholders  —lower  input  costs  and,   11 
hence, higher profit margins may be achieved (for instance, technological advances or 
more  efficient  production  methods  will  allow  the  firm  to  operate  with  fewer 
employees).  However,  these  proactive  downsizing  decisions  are  expected  to  be  less 
frequent  than  the  reactive  ones  (those  taken  as  a  consequence  of  negative  firm 
performance).  Thus,  we  claim  firm  performance  and  downsizing  duration  to  be 
negatively associated, after controlling for the remainder of predictors —among them, 
stakeholder  pressures  to  implement  proactive  downsizing  are  already  taken  into 
consideration  through  the  inclusion  of  the  firm  size  variable  (as  explained  above). 
Profitability is taken into account by two measures of financial accounting outcomes: 
return  on  assets  (operating  income/total  assets)  and  return  on  sales  (operating 
income/total sales). Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis  5:  The  largest  corporate  profitability  is,  the  less  likely  the  firm  is  to 
continue downsizing. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
Data 
The present study utilizes a large sample of yearly spell data from the Spanish Survey of 
Business Strategies (ESEE) for the years 1994 to 2005. This is an annual survey of 
Spanish  manufacturing  firms  sponsored by  the  Ministry  of  Industry  and  carried  out 
since 1990. Certain features of the ESEE make it suitable for our analysis. Firstly, the 
ESEE covers a wide range of Spanish manufacturing firms operating in all industries. 
The sample is representative of Spanish manufacturing firms with between 10 and 200 
employees; it is probabilistic, and stratified by industry and firm size (in terms of the 
number of employees). Secondly, the ESEE provides relevant corporate parameters that 
might  be  driving  the  continuation  of  firms  in  downsizing.  Thirdly,  and  most 
importantly, as of 1993, several questions regarding changes in workforce size were 
included in the survey. Some of the firms in the sample reduced permanent workers 
during the first year they featured in the sample, so we do not know whether this was 
the year they began their spell of downsizing or whether they began some years earlier. 
Should we include these data in the analysis, we would incur in a problem of left 
censoring that would lead to underestimation of the length of such spells. In order to 
avoid this problem, we only consider the downsizing spell if the exact year it began is 
known. Therefore, as we do not consider spells already under way in 1993, the first 
downsizing spells in our sample kick off in 1994. The selected firms are then followed 
until the  year 2005 (which is the last  year  for  which our dataset includes variables 
collecting changes in workforce size). Every firm which goes on reducing its permanent   12 
workforce size after 6 years is considered a censored observation (given the scarcity of 
observations beyond this duration), as well as firms observed in the last downsizing year 
in  the  database  (due  to  the  fact  that  their  ensuing  downsizing  status  remains 
unobserved). After cleaning the data, we ended up with a sample of 1,188 companies 
(1,985 company year observations). 
Sample statistics: The distribution of downsizing duration  
In order to find out how long firms go before stopping permanent workforce reductions, 
we will make use of event history data for discrete time processes. The fundamental 
tool for summarizing the sample distribution of event occurrences is the life table (see 
Table 1). As befits its name, a life table tracks the event histories (the “lives”) of our 
sample  of  companies  from  the  beginning  of  time  (when  no  company  has  yet 
experienced the target event) through the end of data collection (year 2005). In our case, 
we track the downsizing duration of 1,188 companies. Defining the “beginning of time” 
as  the  data  where  the  company  begins  downsizing,  our  research  interest  centers  on 
whether and, if so, when these companies stop downsizing.  
                                  
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                  
In Table 1, we have labeled the time intervals using ordinal numbers. Companies are 
observed at time 0. No event can occur during the 0
th interval, which begins at time 0 
and ends just before year 1, the first observable event time (conceptually, this interval 
represents the “beginning of time”). Each subsequent interval —labeled 1 through 6— 
refers to a specific year. Divided into a series of rows extending time intervals, Table 1 
includes information on the number of companies which: entered the interval (column 
3; i.e., the number of companies where downsizing occurs at the beginning of each 
year
6); experienced the target event during the interval (column 4; i.e., the number who 
stopped downsizing during the year); were censored at the end of the interval (column 
5;  i.e.,  were  still  downsizing  when  data  collection  ended).  Taken  together  all  these 
columns provide a narrative history of event occurrence over time. At the “beginning of 
time” every company was downsizing. During the first year, 475 companies quit by the 
end of that year and 260 were censored. This left only 453 companies (1188 475 260) 
to enter the second year and of these, 186 quit by the end of that year and 85 were 
censored. During the sixth year, of the 24 companies who downsized continuously for 6 
                                                           
6 We use the term risk set to refer to the number of companies who enter each successive time period: 
those eligible to experience the event during that interval.   13 
years, 7 quit by the end of that year and 17 were censored. This life table describes the 
event histories for 1,985 “company years”: 1,188 year 1’s, 453 year 2’s, up through 24 
for year 6’s. 
Additionally, column 6 in Table 1 shows the proportion of companies downsizing at the 
beginning of each year which stopped doing so at the end of the year. That is, it shows 
the conditional probability that company i will stop downsizing in time period j given 
that it did not experience it in any earlier time period (i.e, the hazard; see Section 4 for a 
more  formal  explanation  on  the  hazard  rate).  Among  the  1,188  companies,  0.3998 
(n=475) left by the end of their first year. Of the 453 which kept downsizing for more 
than one year, 0.4106 (n=186) stopped downsizing by the end of their second. These 
proportions  are  the  discrete  limit  of  the  well known  Kaplan Meier  estimates  of  the 
hazard for continuous time data (Efron, 1988).  
                                  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                  
The magnitude of the hazard in each time interval indicates the risk of event occurrence 
in that interval: the greater the hazard, the greater the risk. Figure 1 shows both the 
sample hazard and the predicted hazard (see Table 3 below). As can be observed, in the 
first two years of downsizing, the sample hazard is around 0.40. This indicates that over 
40% of the companies still downsizing at the beginning of each of these years stops 
downsizing by the end of the year. After these initial “hazardous” years, the risk of 
stopping declines (by year 3, the hazard never exceeds 0.30) and then increases during 
the last two years. Therefore, the estimated hazard function peaks in the first few years 
and declines thereafter: it is a non monotonic hazard function (it is U shaped from the 
second year on). Thus, companies are more likely to stop downsizing at two points: 
immediately after their initial implementation and then after having used downsizing for 
a long period of time (five or six years). In the middle period —between the second and 
the  fourth  years—  the  effects  of  experience  reign,  with  relatively  few  continuing 
companies stopping workforce reduction. Therefore, novice downsizers, or those with 
only a few years of experience are at greatest risk of stopping downsizing (it is as if 
companies sought to exit the status of downsizing as quickly as possible). However, 
once they gain experience, the risk of stopping downsizing substantially declines and 
slightly increases for long periods of time. 
Finally, Table 1 shows the survivor function. This function, unlike the hazard function 
(which  assesses  the  unique  risk  associated  with  each  time  period)  cumulates  these 
period by period risks of event occurrence (or more properly, non occurrence) together   14 
to assess the probability that a randomly selected company will “survive” (i.e., will not 
experience  the  event)
7.  The  estimated  survival  probability  for  year  j  is  simply  the 
estimated  survival  probability  for  the  previous  year  multiplied  by  one  minus  the 
estimated hazard probability for that year. For instance, we estimate that 0.354 of all 
companies survive through the second year. Because the estimated hazard probability 
for year 3 is 0.2967, we estimate that 0.7033 of those in the third year risk set will not 
stop downsizing that year. An estimate of the survival probability at the end of the third 
year is thus (0.354)*(0.703)=0.249. Having characterized the distribution of our event 
time of interest (i.e., stopping downsizing) using the hazard and survivor functions, we 
can use an estimate of the distribution center: the estimated median lifetime
8. It is the 
point in time by which we estimated that half of the sample has stopped downsizing, 
half  has  not.  Thus,  it  answers  the  question  “How  long  does  the  average  company 
downsize?” According to Table 1, we know that the estimated median lifetime falls 
somewhere between year 1 and year 2. For this purpose, following Miller (1981), we 
linearly interpolate between the two values of the survivor function that bracket 0.5, and 
obtain an estimated median lifetime of 1.4 years
9.  
Dependent variable 
We record the dependent variable as a series of binary outcomes denoting whether or 
not the event of interest occurred at the observation point (i.e., stopping downsizing).  
As  explained  above,  each  discrete  time  unit  for  each  firm  is  treated  as  a  separate 
observation or unit of analysis. For each of these observations, the dependent variable is 
coded as 1 if the event occurred to that firm in that time unit; otherwise, it is coded zero. 
Thus, if a firm experienced the event at time 5, five different observations would be 
created.  For  the  fifth  observation,  the  dependent  variable  would  be  coded  one.  To 
illustrate the form of the dependent variable used, consider the downsizing data given in 
Table 2. The first column of data gives an identification number for each firm. The 
second column of data is comprised of a sequence of zeroes and ones. A zero denotes 
that in that year, the firm continues reducing the size of its permanent workforce —i.e., 
the event does not occur. A one denotes stopping downsizing —i.e., the event occurs. 
                                                           
7 At the beginning of time, when no one has experienced the event, every company is surviving, and so by 
definition, its value is 1 
8 If there were no censoring, all event times would be known, and we could compute a sample mean. But 
because of censoring, this estimate of central tendency (the median lifetime) is preferred. 
9 Formally, let m represent the time interval when the sample survivor function is just above 0.5 (here, 
year 1), let S(tm) represent the value of the sample survivor function in that interval, and let S(tm+1) 
represent its value for the following interval (when it must be just below 0.5). Then the median lifetime is 
estimated as: Estimated median lifetime= ( ) ( ) m m
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Consider case 1. We see that this firm “enters” the process in 1994 and progresses 
through 6 years until in 1999 the firm stops downsizing: the event occurs. Firm 2 begins 
downsizing  in  year  1997  but  stops  at  the  second  year  (1998).  Thus,  although  our 
dependent variable is a sequence of zeroes and ones, the information conveyed by this 
sequence is equivalent to that conveyed by the actual duration time
10. 
                                  
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                  
Control variables 
A number of economic controls were added following previous research on downsizing 
(descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the analysis are shown in Appendix 
B). 
Employee  productivity.  Managers  usually  undertake  cutback  measures  to  improve 
efficiency when labor productivity drops in order to restore the undermined company 
competitive position (Budros, 1997) and/or to adjust for its oversized staff (Greenhalgh, 
Lawrence  and  Sutton,  1988).  Employee  productivity  is  measured  through  the  value 
added per employee ratio, which allows us to examine the impact of organizational 
performance  on  downsizing  duration,  apart    from  financial  performance.  Moreover, 
given  that  downsizing  is  frequently  encouraged  by  managers  with  the  purpose  of 
decreasing  labor  costs  —and,  therefore,  increases  in  labor  costs  (wage,  salaries  and 
social security contributions) may induce continuation of downsizing— we use the log 
transformation of the ratio of labor costs over sales in order to control the potential 
impact of labor costs on workforce reductions.  
Market  demand.  Demand  changes  are  additionally  viewed  from  an  economic 
perspective as a basic determinant of labor contracting (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1994) as 
well  as  an  environmental  factor  of  organization  size  and  growth  (Harrigan,  1980). 
Evidence for US firms supports a robust relationship between downsizing strategies and 
sales  cutbacks  (Budros,  1997;  DeWitt,  1998).  We  measured  the  trend  of  demand 
through  a  set  of  dummy  variables  collecting  whether  the  market  addressed  by  the 
company has enlarged, remained constant or decreased, as well as through a dummy 
variable  which  collects  whether  the  market  addressed  by  the  firm  is  in  recession.  
Additionally,  we  also  include  the  log  transformation  of  the  firm’s  average  use  of 
                                                           
10 This way of arranging the data allows us collect the cases where a company downsizes for one or two 
years, then stops for a year or two and then resumed the practice.   16 
capacity utilization —in times of weak capacity utilization, employers will be eager to 
continue firing workers (Greenhalgh, Lawrence and Sutton, 1988) 
The  extent  of  permanent  workforce  reduction.  As  the  proportion  of  workforce 
reduction is larger, the firm may naturally have less need to continue downsizing in 
subsequent years because large downsizings may have especially severe effects: a major 
loss of human capital is likely to disrupt a firm’s bundles of resources  and thereby 
downgrade its set of capabilities required to create and sustain a competitive advantage 
(Nixon et al., 2004).  We therefore compute the percent variability in the permanent 
workforce from year t 1 to year t.  
Liquidity and leverage. When a firm is experiencing lower operating income, and this 
situation persists, management may be forced to undertake more drastic measures to 
mitigate the problem: laying off employees may be the only answer as a reaction to 
financial  distress  (Hambrick  and  Schecter,  1983;  Pearce  and  Robbins  1993,  1994; 
Robbins and Pearce, 1992; Schendel and Patton, 1976). By lowering labor expenses, a 
firm may be better able to meet its immediate financial obligations. Moreover, if the 
firm has to service a large amount of debt, it will be more difficult to pay creditors. As a 
result, continuing downsizing will be less desirable, due to the costs associated with the 
reduction in the levels of permanent workers. On the contrary, lower leverage implies 
that  it  is  easier  to  pay  creditors,  so  that  it  becomes  less  necessary  to  reduce  the 
permanent work force size so as to release internal resources for paying creditors or 
convincing them to concede the firm a deferment in payments (Requejo, 1996). We 
therefore take the firm’s debt to assets ratio as an indication of its leverage.  In addition, 
we include the current ratio —i.e., the ratio of current assets to current liabilities— as an 
indication of a firm's market liquidity. 
Firm’s age. Eldest organizations might be more subject to organizational inertia and 
resistance  to  change,  due  to  their  bureaucratization  as  time  goes  by  (Hannan  and 
Freeman, 1984). Thus, according to this view, such firms will be more reluctant to go 
on  downsizing.  Moreover,  as  time  goes  by,  lack  of  coherence  between  firm’s 
environment and its organizational structure is more likely, so that a need for continuing 
with downsizing practices may be more compelling. In addition, the firm’s life cycle is 
an important factor behind restructuring decisions (Coucke, Peenings and Sleuwagen, 
2007). Older firms facing more competitive pressure and operating in mature markets 
have  to  focus  on  cost  reduction:  thus,  they  may  find  it  more  profitable  to  go  on 
downsizing.    Age  is  included  through  a  set  of  four dummy  variables  collecting  the 
firm’s foundation year: <1960, ≥1960 & £1975, >1975 & £1985 and >1985.   17 
Type of ownership. In order to account for the effects of different types of ownership, 
we  distinguish  five  categories:  Individual  owner,  Public  Limited  Company,  Limited 
Company,  Cooperative  and  Other.  In  addition,  since  the  selection  of  managerial 
personnel policies is influenced by whether an organization is in the public or private 
sector (Dobbin et al. 1998), we control whether a firm’s capital is owned by a public 
institution in a substantial proportion by including a dummy variable which takes the 
value  1  if  public  ownership  is  above  50  percent  of  total  capital  (and  0  otherwise).  
Analogously, as the origin of the corporate block holder investing in the firm may affect 
the  behavior  of  the  firm  and  its  knowledge  of  downsizing  strategies,  we  include  a 
dummy variable, which takes the value 1 if foreign ownership is above 50 percent of 
total capital (and 0 otherwise). 
Industry and local economic cycle effects. Differences between trade union influences 
may exist among industries, which may shorten or lengthen the downsizing experiences. 
In addition, in highly automated industries downsizing will be infrequently continued to 
improve firm performance as these industries typically have less human (as compared to 
equipment) contribution to the final products (Cherns, 1976; Susman and Chase, 1986; 
Trist, 1978) —on the contrary, in low automation manufacturing industries, downsizing 
may  have  a  greater  impact  on  firm  performance  because  there  is  more  human 
contribution  to  the  organization’s  output  (and  will  therefore  be  more  necessary  to 
maintain).  Moreover,  firms  in  various  industries  may be  more  inclined  to  downsize 
because  the  effects  of  economic  factors  may  be  greater  on  these  firms.  For  these 
reasons, we control the industry by including dummies for twenty categories
11. Finally, 
workforce  reduction  is  typically  countercyclical;  i.e.,  it  peaks  during  economic 
downturns and declines during periods of economic growth (Fallick, 1996: 1), with the 
reason being that in difficult economic times, a firm’s need to reduce expenses is larger 
(Nixon et al., 2004). Thus, we include as a covariate the unemployment rate in each 
Spanish region where firms are located. 
METHOD 
 
In this section, we model the probability that a firm will stop reducing personnel after 
some specific interval of time (conditional on continuing downsizing up to that point). 
Given the structure of the discrete time data and the form of our dependent variable (see 
                                                           
11 Meat Products, Tobacco and Food, Drinks, Textile Products, Leather and Shoes, Wood Products, Paper 
Products, Publishing and Graphic Arts, Chemical Products, Plastic materials and Rubber, Non metallic 
minerals, Metallurgy, Metallic Products, Machinery & mechanical equipment, Office machinery & 
computing equipment, Electric machinery & equipment, Motor vehicles, Other transportation equipment, 
Furniture and Other manufacturing industries   18 
Section 3.3), we will make use of an event history (i.e., a record of when this event 
occurred to the firms in our sample). The hazard probability conveniently conveys this 
notion  of  risk,  as  it  reflects  the  probability  of  stopping  downsizing,  conditional  on 
survival and covariates. In our case, the event can occur at any point in time, but the 
ESEE only collects whether the firms downsize in each year. Thus, we will apply the 
following discrete time model. 
We assume that time can take on only positive integer values (t=1, 2, 3, …) and that we 
observe a total of n  independent firms (i=1, 2, …, n) beginning at some natural point 
t=1. The observation continues until time ti, at which point either downsizing is stopped 
or the observation is censored. Censoring means that the company is observed at ti but 
not at ti+1. It is assumed that the time of censoring is independent of the hazard rate for 
the occurrence of events. Also observed is a Kx1 vector of explanatory variables xit, 
which may take on different values at different discrete times. We begin by defining the 
discrete time hazard rate: 
[ ] it i i it x t T t T P , | Pr ³ = =           (1) 
where T is the discrete random variable giving the uncensored time of event occurrence 
(i.e., stopping downsizing). Pit is the conditional probability that the event occurs at 
time t, given that it has not already occurred. 
The next step is to specify how this hazard rate depends on time and the explanatory 
variables.  If  one  assumes  that  the  data  are  generated  by  the  continuous time 
proportional hazards model
12, it has been shown (Holford, 1976) that the corresponding 
discrete time hazard function is given by: 
( ) [ ] it t it x P b a ¢ + - - = exp exp 1         (2) 
where the coefficient vector β is a Kx1 vector of constants and represents the effects of 
the explanatory variables on the probability of the event.  Thus, if x1 has a positive 
coefficient β1, an increase in x1 produces an increase in the likelihood that the event will 
occur. By assumption, these effects are constant over time. Note that αt (t=1,2,…) is just 
a set of constants and collects the organizational experience in downsizing (hypothesis 
1).  Here,  we  apply  a  very  general  way  to  account  for  duration  in  downsizing:  the 
inclusion of temporal dummy variables —i.e., by specifying interval specific (annual) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
12 The functional form of the proportional hazards model in continuous form is: ( ) ( ) x t x t b a l ¢ + = , log , 
where α(t) is an unspecified function of time, β is a Kx1 vector of constants, and λ(t,x) is the hazard rate, 
which can be defined as:  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t F t f t - = 1 / l , where f(t) is the probability density for T, and F(t) is the 
cumulative distribution function for T. It is called the proportional hazards model because the ratio of the   19 
dummies  (αt),  with  one  for  each  year  at  risk.  Therefore,  this  implies  a  fully  non 
parametric baseline hazard. Because the method does not specify a functional form for 
the baseline hazard, it is more robust than parameter approaches. Parametric models rely 
on fully specifying the base line hazard. However, the chosen functional form may not 
be  valid  and  it  is  particularly  vulnerable  to  problems  caused  by  unobserved 
heterogeneity across firms (Jones 2005). 
Equation (2) may be solved to yield the so called complementary log log function: 
 
( ) [ ] it t it x P b a ¢ + = - 1 log log           (3) 
   
The likelihood of the data may be written as follows: 
( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] Õ
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- > = =
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where δi is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the observation is uncensored and zero 
if censored. 
Each of the probabilities in (4) can be expressed as a function of the hazard rate. Using 
elementary properties of conditional probabilities, it can be shown that: 
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Substituting  (5)  and  (6)  into  (4)  and  taking  the  logarithm  yields  the  log likelihood 
function: 
































log log d         (7) 
At this point one can substitute the appropriate regression model for Pit (equation 3) and 
then proceed to maximize logL with respect to αt (t=1, 2, 3, …) and β. Allison (1984) 
and Jenkins (1995) show that —by defining the dummy variable yit equal to 1 if firm i 
stops downsizing at time t, otherwise zero— (7) can be rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ∑∑
= =
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hazard rate for any two companies at any point in time is a constant over time. See Allison (1982) for 
further details.   20 
which  is  the  log  likelihood  for  the  regression  analysis  of  dichotomous  dependent 
variables (Cox, 1970; Hanushek and Jackson, 1977; Nerlove and Press, 1983). Thus, the 
discrete time hazard model described above can be estimated using programs for the 
analysis of dichotomous data. 
Finally, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity is particularly important. Recall, for 
instance, that according to constraining and cloning forces (Section 2.1), firms tend to 
copy cat  other  firm’s  downsizing  practices.  However,  the  ability  to  do  this  must 
necessarily be left out of the empirical model proposed because it is immeasurable
13. 
This way, unobserved heterogeneity will be induced in the model as such covariate is 
not included in the model’s specification. This can lead to problematic inferences in so 
far as parameter estimates can be inconsistent. Consider the case where there are two 
types  of  firms:  “frail”  companies  which  have  a  high  (but  constant)  hazard  rate  and 
“strong” companies which have a low (but constant) hazard rate. The two groups may 
be equally mixed in the population to begin with, but over time the frailer companies 
will  tend  to  stop  downsizing  first,  leading  to  an  unequal  mix.  As  time  passes,  the 
proportion of frail companies will decrease and the overall hazard will decrease. If it is 
not possible to control for the heterogeneity between the two types of firms, this will 
give the appearance of a decreasing hazard over time. We thus deal with unobserved 
heterogeneity by introducing into the hazard rate an additional random parameter that 
amounts  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  (Hougaard,  2000).  This  way,  we  treat 
unobserved heterogeneity non parametrically, by assuming that the unobservable error 
term has a discrete distribution characterised by a set of mass points, where the value of 
these mass points and the probabilities attached to them are estimated as part of the 




Table  3  shows  the  estimation  results  for  the  discrete  time  hazard  model  presented 
previously. Model 1 differs from Model 2 in that the former includes the return on sales 
(ROS), while the latter makes use of the return on assets (ROA) as the measure for 
corporate  performance.  To  check  whether  the  number  of  mass  points  is  robust  as 
regards the specification with unobservables, three alternative information criteria were 
                                                           
13 Moreover, the standard measure of mimicry (the percentage of firms in an industry that have 
downsized) cannot be added as an explanatory variable, since it precisely represents the hazard rate at 
each time interval (see Section 3.2). 
14 Alternatively, unobserved heterogeneity can be dealt with by parametrically (i.e., by specifying a 
parametric distribution for the unobserved heterogeneity such as a normal, gamma distribution, etc.). 
However, this approach has been criticised by Heckman and Singer (1984), as the unobserved   21 
applied: the Akaike information criterion, the Hannan Quinn criterion and the Bayesian 
information criterion. All information criteria lead to the same conclusion: in any model 
specification where firm unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account, including two 
mass  points  did  not  improve  the  model  fit.
15  Thus,  as  we  cannot  reject  the  null 
hypothesis  that  unobserved  heterogeneity  is  relevant,  the  estimated  models  do  not 
include any mass points: our comments will be based on the models where unobserved 
heterogeneity is not taken into account.  
                                     
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                  
The discrete time hazard models include two types of parameters. On the one hand, 
those  representing  the  baseline  hazard  function  (i.e.:  the  time  indicators: Year1,  …, 
Year6) —see the previous section. On the other hand, the remainder of the parameters 
represent the hypothesized influence of each predictor on the hazard rate. The sign on 
each of these latter coefficients indicates the effect on the hazard rate out of downsizing. 
That is, a negative (positive) coefficient has a positive (negative) effect on the duration.  
 
The time indicators 
Note that unlike the familiar regression model, Models 1 and 2 contain no single stand 
alone intercept
16. Instead, the parameters (Year1,… Year6) act like multiple intercepts 
—one per time period—, indicating the value of the outcome in each particular period. 
We can interpret these parameters as intercepts because of the way we have defined the 
time indicators. In the sixth year, for example, only Year6=1, so that all other terms 
(Year1,..,Year5) disappear, leaving the population value of the hazard in the 6
th year to 
be its estimated coefficient. Taken together, these parameters represent the estimated 
baseline hazard function. The amount and direction of variation in their values describe 
the shape of this function and tell us whether risk increases, decreases or remains steady 
over time. The estimated baseline hazard is non significant in Model 1: therefore, in this 
model, the risk of stopping downsizing is unrelated to time. However, in Model 2, the 
estimated time indicators become significant for every year except for Year2 and Year6: 
the baseline hazard declines up to the fourth year, and then slightly increases. Thus, 
according to Model 2, the risk of stopping downsizing significantly decreases over time 
                                                                                                                                                                          
heterogeneity distribution is unknown. These authors show that parametric form assumptions for 
unobserved heterogeneity might be biased when the chosen distribution is incorrect. 
15 Results are available upon request.   22 
up to the fourth year (which offers support for hypothesis 1). Figure 1 plots its values 
(calculated  for  sample  means  at  all  covariates,  except  for  those  capturing  the  time 
indicators).  As  can  be  observed,  in  year  2  the  fitted  hazard  probability  reaches  its 
maximum (0.4817), and then falls to a minimum of 0.3513 in Year 4.  
The remainder of estimated coefficients 
The  proportion  of  temporary  workers  is  a  statistically  significant  variable,  as  it 
significantly  increases  the  hazard  rate.  Therefore,  firms  with  a  higher  proportion  of 
temporary  workers  are  less  likely  to  continue  cutting  the  size  of  their  permanent 
workforce. We may conclude, therefore, that fixed term contracts raise the flexibility of 
firms: when the need arises to continue downsizing —which may be the case when the 
firm  faces  a  severe  downturn  as  opposed  to  a  short term  fluctuation—  varying  the 
peripheral workforce can help to save costs and to accelerate employment adjustment. 
These results, thus, offer support for the core periphery hypothesis (hypothesis 3). 
On the contrary, employment termination costs (as a proportion over total personnel 
costs)  present  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  decision  to  continue  reducing 
permanent work force size. These costs are associated with a lower propensity by firms 
to stop downsizing —this result does not support hypothesis 2. Thus, in spite of the 
institutional  features  of  the  Spanish  labor  market  —which  gives  workers  strong 
employment  rights,  and  therefore,  imposes  important  constraints  upon  employers’ 
downsizing  behavior—  job  security  regulation  need  not  inhibit  the  decision  of 
employers to continue downsizing, suggesting that the impact of dismissal related costs 
is relatively insubstantial. This result is in line with studies on the effects of firing costs 
on employment adjustment, which do not support the conclusion that firing costs slow 
firms’ decision to adjust employment levels (e.g., Abraham and Houseman, 1994; Hunt, 
2000). Rather, it is as if despite incurring employment termination costs, firms still 
needed to adjust their work force by getting rid of the least productive workers (Toharia 
and Malo, 2000). 
Finally, we find that large firms survive longer in downsizing than small firms. This 
occurs for firms with more than 50 employees. Indeed, the hazard rate is lower as firm 
size is larger. Thus, once downsizing has begun, larger firms have a larger propensity to 
continue with personnel reductions, which offers support for hypothesis 4. And both 
measures of profitability (ROS and ROA) exert a positive impact on the hazard rate out 
of downsizing, which offers support for hypothesis 5.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
16 Some readers may be more familiar with a specification that includes a stand alone intercept and 
excludes one of the time indicators. This alternative specification, although identical in fit to the   23 
As regards control variables, the likelihood of stopping downsizing increases with the 
value  added  to  employee  ratio,  although  only  in  Model  2.  On  the  contrary,  when 
demand shortfalls are experienced due to an economic recession (which is likely to be 
affecting  more  or  less  all  firms  in  the  sample),  continuation  of  downsizing  is  more 
compelling.  Thus,  experiencing  performance  difficulties  due  to  market  trends  is  a 
relevant  explanatory  factor  of  the  length  of  on going  downsizing  efforts.  On  the 
contrary, the regional unemployment rate presents a positive impact on the hazard rate. 
This may be explained by the fact that regions with a higher unemployment rate are 
characterized by a larger presence of temporary workers so that, instead of getting rid of 
permanent workers, an alternative might be simply getting rid of temporary workers. 
Finally, the estimated coefficients for age show that firms whose year of incorporation 
is  between  1975  and  1985  face  higher  chances  of  failure  (that  is,  of  ending  their 
downsizing spell). This result underscores the firm’s lifecycle as an important factor 
behind downsizing decisions (Coucke, Peenings and Sleuwagen,  2007): as eldest firms 
facing more competitive pressure and operating in mature markets have to focus on cost 




The  1980s  and  1990s  witnessed  unprecedented  levels  of  restructuring.  In  order  to 
survive, companies had to cut costs by closing down operations, radically reorganizing 
work processes, and reducing their workforces throughout the ranks of the organization. 
Such  intense  change  processes  were  often  conducted  under  the  banners  of 
reengineering, lean management and downsizing. In this paper, we have used Spanish 
manufacturing data (the Survey on Business Strategies) to investigate the determinants 
of firms’ duration in downsizing.  
The analysis performed has found some important drivers of downsizing duration. In 
particular, results have offered support for the core periphery hypothesis, in so far as 
firms with a high proportion of temporary workers are less likely to continue reducing 
the size of its permanent workforce: thus, fixed term contracts raise the flexibility of 
firms, since varying the peripheral workforce instead of the core workforce helps to 
save  employment  adjustment  costs  (especially  when  the  environmental  context  is 
characterized  by  economic  or  industry  difficulties).  In  addition,  continuation  of 
downsizing  is  negatively  associated  with  a  recessive  trend  in  the  market,  which 
                                                                                                                                                                          
specification we present, precludes the simple interpretation of the coefficients for Year1,.. Year 6.   24 
confirms corporate demand as a significant explanatory factor of downsizing practices 
found in previous studies. Moreover, strong support has been offered as regards firm 
size as a stimulus for longer downsizing duration: large firms continue downsizing for 
longer than small firms.  
Our  results  show  that,  on  average,  downsizing  spells  are  rather  short  (the  median 
company in our dataset downsizes for only 1.4 years). This result is relevant, in so far as 
since  the  granting  of  regional  autonomy  in  1982,  the  Spanish  Government  has 
distributed  massive  subsidies  in  order  to  rescue  companies  in  economic  difficulties 
which have been downsizing for long. However, spending time and money in rescuing 
threatened  companies  in  order  to  prevent  their  collapse  has  negative  outcomes
17. 
Therefore, the shorter downsizing spells are, the less negative outcomes will arise in this 
sense.  
In addition, we have found that downsizing duration is positively associated with the 
magnitude of employment termination costs. This result is contrary to the theoretical 
expectation,  since,  given  that  laws  in  Spain  give  workers  strong  employment  rights 
(including the right to advance notice of layoff and the right to severance pay and other 
redundancy compensation), employers in this country are expected to shorten the spell 
of downsizing insofar as this implies incurring larger costs in labor adjustment. On the 
contrary,  our  findings  indicate  that  strong  employment  security  need  not  inhibit 
employers’ downsizing behavior. This result is in line with studies on the effects of 
severance costs on employment adjustment which do not support the conclusion that 
severance costs slow a firm’s decision to adjust employment levels. 
Finally, our findings indicate that the length of time a firm has downsized presents a 
negative impact on the likelihood of continuing to downsize for longer. In particular, 
from  the  second  year  of  experience  in  downsizing,  a  substantial  proportion  of 
companies go on with the implementation of downsizing, although, from the data at 
hand,  it  is  impossible  to  evaluate  whether  institutional  or  organizational  learning 
concerns are behind this pattern. However, given that this result has been found not to 
be robust enough, we conclude that a replication in Spain of the pattern observed in the 
United States (where corporate persistence in downsizing is frequent) does not seem to 
be very common. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding that the magnitude of the 
implemented reduction does not shorten the downsizing duration.  
                                                           
17 Indeed, there has been a change of investment policy in recent years which have involved finding other 
investors in the private sector or handling failed companies over to cooperatives formed by groups of 
redundant workers (see Toharia and Ojeda, 1999).   25 
Although  it  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study  to  assess  whether  downsizing  was 
effective and sufficient to meet the companies’ current goals, our work suggests that 
Spanish companies may have learned from the U.S. experience that the organizational 
and human costs of insufficiently well planned downsizing are high, so that carefully 
planned  strategies  need  to  be  devised.  On  the  other  hand,  given  that  downsizing 
practices are anchored in a particular legal or cultural framework and are, therefore, not 
directly  applicable  in  another  setting  —particularly  laws  on  dismissals  and  the 
involvement of work committees (which differ between countries) — the findings may 
reflect  European  laws  and  traditions  rather  than  the  outcome  of  learning  through 
observation  from  the  U.S.  The  legislative  context  in  western  continental  Europe  —
which provides workers with far greater protection from redundancies than in the U.S. 
— probably contributes to the fact that if companies need to further downsize in Spain, 
they may opt, instead, for maximizing alternatives to layoffs by redeploying employees 
to  other  parts  of  the  company  or  changing  work time  practices.  These  results  are 
sensible  insofar  as  repeated  downsizing  —which  is  empirically  rare,  as  we  have 
shown— may represent a significant change among Spanish companies, tending to call 
into  question  organizational  values,  norms,  and  processes  that  are  usually  widely 
accepted and deeply engrained. As downsizing implies (particularly in Europe) shifting 
from the basic assumption of job security to recognizing that stable employment is no 
longer  guaranteed, many  companies downsizing the workforce at  all levels may be, 
therefore,  having  to  re work  their  understanding  of  their  world  and  their  role  and 
relationships within the system. Apart from being costly, this is time consuming, insofar 
as  at  the  organizational  level  it  essentially  means  that  the  implicit  contract  with  its 
members needs to be redefined. 
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APPENDIX A: Procedures for employee reductions by employers in Spain 
Worker dismissals 
There  are  two  basic  ways  through  which  any  employer  may  adjust  its  workforce:  (i)  not 
renewing temporary contracts; and (ii) dismiss, either individually or collectively, some of its 
permanent workers.  Permanent contracts may only be terminated, under Spanish law, according 
to  legally  defined  causes  (unfair  dismissals  can  be  very  expensive.  Indeed,  if  an  employer 
terminates  such  contract  without  good  cause  (see  below)  the  employee  will  be  entitled  to 
receiving  a  severance  compensation  based  on  45  days  of  salary  per  year  of  service  in  the 
company  capped  at  3  and  ½  years  of  salary  (which  corresponds to  more  than  28  years of 
service). On the one hand, if the size of the adjustment is large enough —meaning roughly 10 
percent of the workforce— the employer has to negotiate a procedure called Expediente de 
regulacion de empleo with the workers (which includes the amount of severance pay, for which 
the law only establishes a minimum). Redundancy payments in Spain are calculated at 20 days’ 
pay per year of service, up to a maximum of 12 months’ pay. Likewise, when a collective (or 
objective) dismissal is found to be unjustified, the compensation amounts to 45 days’ pay —
except  for “promotion contracts” when the unfairly dismissed worker receives the equivalent of 
33 days’ pay. On the other hand, if the size of the required adjustment does not meet the criteria 
to be considered collective, firms may initiate an individual dismissal procedure which may take 
the form of (i) an “objective” dismissal —meaning a dismissal on the grounds of economic or 
technological circumstances; i.e., objectively justified— or (ii) a disciplinary dismissal. The 
latter are usually preferred by firms because there are fewer requirements involved (no advance 
notice is required and no initial severance payment has to be deposited; however, the employer 
faces a financial risk in case of a disciplinary dismissal to be unfair of 45 days of salary per year 
of service). In objective dismissals, if the motives for dissolving the contract are accredited, the 
severance paid to the employee should be equivalent to 20 days’ salary per year worked, up to a 
maximum of one year’s pay—otherwise, if the company can not accredit the reason for the 
termination, or breaches the formal and procedural communication requisites, it will have to opt 
to either pay the employee severance pay equivalent to 45 days’ salary per year worked, up to a 
maximum of 42 monthly payments, or to readmit the employee under the conditions in place 
prior to dismissal.  
Early retirement and voluntary severance packages  
The Law contemplates two early retirement formulae: early retirement at the age of 52 and 
reduced rate early retirement — while others form the subject of collective bargaining. As a 
means to adjust employment, early retirement is rather widespread nowadays. It is only scarcely 
the  result  of  a  voluntary  decision  by  the  worker;  instead,  it  is  a  frequent  consequence  of 
employment adjustment processes. Pensions are usually reduced in an extent dependent on both 
workers’ labor market experience and their distance to the statutory retirement age (65 years 
old). However, these agreements cover the possibility that in the event of crisis accords or 
“social  plans”  —created  in  order  to  manage  and  cushion  the  consequences  of  collective 
dismissals or in the case of collective contracts involving firms affected by over manning— the 
employer may agree to pay a sum equivalent to the old age pension, until the worker reaches the 
age of 65, a system quite common in Spain (Toharia and Ojeda, 1999). Thus, these incentives 
induce elderly workers to exit the labor force before they reach the age of 65, and serve to 
protect  workers  who  get  jobless  when  firms  implement  collective  dismissals.  In  fact,  it  is 
frequent for dismissed individuals in case of being above 52 years old and after the exhaustion 
of contributory unemployment benefits, to be entitled to receiving assistance benefits up to the 
early retirement age. Apart from early retirement programmes (which are frequently offered in 
restructuring, since employers are obliged by law to offer measures designed to alleviate its 
social effects), negotiated alternatives between companies and work councils may include part 
time work programmes, transfers to other locations of the same firm and “voluntary severance 
programmes”.  The  use  of  voluntary  departures  as  a  means  to  cushioning  redundancy  is 
extremely widespread (there is no age limit established). Voluntary severance incentives are 
offered to reduce head count through self selection. These incentives can include continuation 
of compensation for a specified period of time, a one time lump sum payment or maintenance of 
certain benefits paid for by the company. Benefits often consist of life or health insurance, 
memberships, educational assistance and so on.    27 
APPENDIX B: Main descriptive statistics 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Censored observations (1=Yes)  0.619  0.486  0.000  1.000 
Percentage reduction in total workforce at current year  12.299  14.928  0.137  100.000 
Percentage ratio of (Employment termination costs/Total personnel costs)
b   2.224  5.437  0.000  68.719 
Foundation year (dummy variables):   
<1960  0.186  0.390  0.000  1.000 
≥1960 & £1975  0.248  0.432  0.000  1.000 
>1975 & £1985  0.189  0.392  0.000  1.000 
>1985  0.376  0.484  0.000  1.000 
Log(Average degree of capacity utilization)  4.385  0.206  2.996  4.605 
Market in recession (1=Yes)  0.222  0.416  0.000  1.000 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy variables):         
Increasing  0.218  0.413  0.000  1.000 
Constant  0.629  0.483  0.000  1.000 
Diminishing  0.154  0.361  0.000  1.000 
Log(Ratio of labor costs over sales)   2.133  1.040   4.925  0.098 
ROS  8.379  12.687   165.900  53.700 
ROA  12.634  18.550   157.258  349.164 
Value Added per Employee  42.475  30.457   35.810  327.322 
Ratio of (Temporary workers/total number of employees)  0.149  0.187  0.000  1.000 
Leverage  0.118  0.153  0.000  0.847 
Liquidity  10.515  50.644  0.000  1535.919 
Above 50 percent of capital owned by a foreign company (1=Yes)  0.337  0.473  0.000  1.000 
Above 50 percent of company’s capital is publicly owned (1=Yes)  0.486  0.500  0.000  1.000 
Type of ownership (dummy variables):         
Individual owner  0.009  0.095  0.000  1.000 
Public Limited Company  0.675  0.469  0.000  1.000 
Limited Company  0.274  0.446  0.000  1.000 
Cooperative  0.038  0.192  0.000  1.000 
Other  0.005  0.067  0.000  1.000 
Regional unemployment rate  13.664  6.341  4.710  34.240 
Firm size (expressed as total number of employees; dummy variables):         
≤ 50  0.461  0.499  0.000  1.000 
>50 & ≤ 100  0.089  0.285  0.000  1.000 
>100 & ≤ 200  0.120  0.325  0.000  1.000 
>200 & ≤ 500  0.213  0.409  0.000  1.000 
>500  0.117  0.321  0.000  1.000 
Sample size: 1,985. No. of firms: 1,188.  
a All variables derived from  the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies and own author’s calculations, 
except for the regional unemployment rate (source: Spanish Labor Force Survey, INE). 
b Employment termination costs are defined as the sum of severance, early retirement and voluntary 
severance pay.   28 
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TABLE 1. Life table describing the number of years in downsizing  
 












at the end 
of the year 
Firms at the beginning of 
the year who stopped 
downsizing during the 
year (Hazard function) 
All companies still 
downsizing at the 
end of the year 
(Survival function) 
0  1188           1.000 
1  1188  475  260  0.3998  0.600 
2  453  186  85  0.4106  0.354 
3  182  54  34  0.2967  0.249 
4  94  22  28  0.2340  0.191 
5  44  12  8  0.2727  0.139 
6  24  7  17  0.2917  0.098 
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TABLE 2.Example of Discrete Time Event History Data 
 
Case I.D.  Dependent Variable: Event Ocurrence  Year  Time Elapsed 
1  0  1994  1 













1  1  1999  6 
2  0  1997  1 
2  1  1998  2   38 
TABLE 3.Maximum likelihood estimates (discrete time proportional hazard model) 
      Model 1  Model 2 
Determinants  Coeff.  Std. Error  Signif.  Coeff.  Std. Error  Signif. 
Duration dependence (dummy variables):             
Year 1   1.885  1.312     2.357  1.318  ** 
Year 2   1.627  1.312     2.096  1.317   
Year 3   1.836  1.318     2.323  1.323  * 
Year 4   2.061  1.326     2.514  1.333  * 
Year 5   1.803  1.366     2.318  1.372  * 
Year 6   1.641  1.402     2.147  1.406   
% Reduction in total workforce   0.006  0.004     0.007  0.004   
% Ratio of (Employment termination 
costs/Total personnel costs)   0.034  0.020  *   0.036  0.020  * 
(% ratio of Employment termination 
costs/Total personnel costs)
2  0.001  0.001    0.001  0.001   
Foundation year (dummy variables):             
<1960                   
≥1960 & £1975  0.256  0.171    0.257  0.170   
>1975 & £1985  0.340  0.187  *  0.375  0.187  ** 
>1985  0.031  0.176    0.019  0.176   
Log(Average degree of capacity utilization)  0.033  0.267    0.103  0.265   
Market in recession (1=Yes)   0.349  0.149  **   0.350  0.149  ** 
Market addressed by firm is (dummy 
variables):       
     
Increasing                   
Constant   0.158  0.128     0.171  0.127   
Diminishing   0.065  0.195     0.051  0.194   
Log(Ratio of labor costs over sales)   0.016  0.071     0.015  0.071   
ROS  0.027  0.006  ***          
ROA           0.015  0.004  *** 
Value Added per Employee  0.002  0.002    0.005  0.002  ** 
Ratio of (Temporary workers/total number of 
employees)  2.144  0.335  ***  2.195  0.334  *** 
Liquidity  0.078  0.354    0.103  0.351   
Current ratio   0.003  0.002     0.002  0.002   
Above 50 percent of capital owned by a 
foreign company (1=Yes)  0.111  0.125    0.108  0.125   
Above 50 percent of company’s capital is 
publicly owned   0.500  0.107  ***   0.499  0.107  *** 
Type of ownership (dummy variables):             
Individual owner                   
Public Limited Company  0.952  0.576  *  1.053  0.605  * 
Limited Company  1.136  0.580  **  1.255  0.608  ** 
Cooperative  0.947  0.629    1.043  0.654   
Other  1.029  0.933    1.108  0.952   
Regional unemployment rate  0.031  0.011  ***  0.030  0.011  *** 
Firm size (dummy variables):             
≤ 50                   
>50 & ≤ 100   0.549  0.194  ***   0.507  0.194  *** 
>100 & ≤ 200   0.760  0.188  ***   0.739  0.188  *** 
>200 & ≤ 500   0.886  0.165  ***   0.873  0.166  *** 
>500   1.182  0.219  ***   1.147  0.220  *** 
 Log Likelihood   1149.8262   1153.5147 
Notes:  *  p<0.10;  **  p<0.05;  ***  p<0.01.  Estimations  also  include  controls  for  industries.  Sample 
size=1,985 observations. 
 